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Note 
KHALIFA V. SHANNON: HOW MUCH INTERFERENCE IS TOO 
MUCH WHEN IT COMES TO A TORT FOR INTERFERING WITH 
THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP? 
BETH ROSENBERG  
In Khalifa v. Shannon,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals considered 
whether Maryland recognizes a cause of action in tort for intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship and whether a claimant must 
show that the interference caused an economic loss to maintain a viable 
cause of action.2  The court held that a tort claim exists for intentional 
interference with custodial and visitation rights and that an economic loss of 
services is not necessary for a viable claim.3  In so holding, the court 
improperly based its decision on Hixon v. Buchberger4 by concluding that 
Maryland had recognized a cause of action for interference with the parent-
child relationship in that case.5  Although allowing a cause of action for 
interference with custodial rights is in accordance with policy 
considerations and the national trend,6 the court failed to consider the 
significant negative policy implications raised by its unnecessarily broad 
decision.7  Thus, although the court correctly decided the case at issue given 
the severity of the facts, it should have restricted the scope of its holding to 
only allow recovery in tort for intentional interference with custodial 
rights.8 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Beth Rosenberg. 
  Beth Rosenberg is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law 
where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  Special thanks to Heather R. Pruger, 
Executive Notes and Comments Editor; Hannah Kon, Notes and Comments Editor; and Clayton 
Solomon, Associate Editor, for their tremendous effort and help throughout the publishing 
process. 
 1. 404 Md. 107, 945 A.2d 1244 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 115, 945 A.2d at 1248.   
 3. Id. at 111, 945 A.2d at 1246. 
 4. 306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
 7. See infra Part IV.C. 
 8. See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
Michael Shannon and Nermeen Khalifa Shannon were married in 1996 
and had a child, Adam Osama Shannon, in 1997.9  In January 2000, 
Michael and Nermeen separated.10  After reconciling, they had another son, 
Jason Osama Khalifa.11  Michael and Nermeen separated again in February 
2001, and on February 27, 2001, a circuit court granted Michael ―legal and 
primary physical care and custody of Adam‖ and granted Nermeen ―legal 
and primary physical care and custody of Jason.‖12  The court granted both 
parents reasonable visitation rights with their non-custodial children.13  
In August 2001, Michael allowed Nermeen and her mother, Afaf 
Nassar Khalifa, to take Adam and Jason to New York to visit relatives on 
the condition that Nermeen returned both boys to him by August 26, 
2001.14  Nermeen, Afaf, Adam, and Jason arrived in New York on Friday, 
August 24, 2001.15  On August 25, 2001, without Michael‘s consent or 
knowledge, Nermeen and Afaf took both boys to Egypt instead of returning 
them to Michael.16   
Petitioner Afaf Khalifa, the boys‘ grandmother, was extradited to 
Maryland from Egypt.17  The trial court found Afaf guilty of violating 
Family Law Article, section 9-305 and its amended version.18  Afaf was 
sentenced to three years in prison with a $5,000 fine.19  Both the Court of 
Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed Afaf‘s 
conviction.20   
 
 9. Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md. 107, 111, 945 A.2d 1244, 1246 (2008).  Nermeen, a citizen 
of Egypt, moved to Maryland in 1989 when she turned twenty-one.  Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 
400, 408, 855 A.2d 1175, 1179–80 (2004).  
 10. Khalifa, 404 Md. at 111, 945 A.2d at 1246. 
 11. Khalifa, 382 Md. at 409, 855 A.2d at 1180. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Khalifa, 404 Md. at 112, 945 A.2d at 1246.  Afaf Nassar Khalifa came to Washington, 
D.C. from Egypt on August 18, 2001 and stayed with Nermeen temporarily.  Id. 
 15. Khalifa, 382 Md. at 410, 855 A.2d at 1181. 
 16. Khalifa, 404 Md. at 112, 945 A.2d at 1246. 
 17. Id., 945 A.2d at 1247.  Afaf Khalifa is also an Egyptian citizen.  Khalifa, 382 Md. at 408, 
855 A.2d at 1179–80. 
 18. Khalifa, 382 Md. at 407, 855 A.2d at 1179.  Afaf Khalifa was convicted of ten counts of 
harboring; being an accessory to abduction and detaining; and conspiring to abduct, detain, and 
harbor a child outside of the state and outside of the United States.  Id. at 413–14, 855 A.2d at 
1182–83. 
 19. Id. at 414, 855 A.2d at 1183.  A three-judge sentence review panel decreased Afaf's fine 
from $15,000 to $5,000 and reduced her total prison sentence from ten years to three years by 
ordering her sentences to run concurrently instead of consecutively.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 414, 416, 855 A.2d at 1183–84. 
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The civil case against Petitioners Nermeen and Afaf for the abduction 
of Adam and Jason went to trial in December 2006.21  The jury awarded 
Michael Shannon $17,500 in attorney fees and costs, $1,000,000 in 
compensatory damages, and $2,000,000 in punitive damages.22  Afaf and 
Nermeen appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.23  Before the 
Court of Special Appeals heard the case, however, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to decide whether a cause of action existed for 
intentional interference with custody and visitation rights and whether an 
economic loss of services was required for a viable abduction claim.24 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND  
At common law, tort remedies for interference with the parent-child 
relationship were limited to child abduction cases that conceptualized 
children as property.25  Thus, courts required a loss of services to bring a 
valid abduction claim at common law.26  However, the loss of services 
requirement faded in modern jurisprudence as courts recognized the 
important relationship between a parent and child.27  The current national 
trend favors adopting a civil cause of action for interference with the 
custodial parent-child relationship that is more inclusive than the tort for 
child abduction.28  Despite the trend to adopt a new tort for intentional 
interference with custodial relationships, most courts have refused to extend 
the tort to intentional interference with visitation rights.29  Prior to Khalifa, 
Maryland had not followed this trend because no appropriate case had 
presented itself.30 
A.  The Evolution of Tort Remedies for Child Abduction Claims 
At common law, there was no tort remedy for the abduction of a child 
unless the plaintiff was the father and the child was the father‘s heir.31  This 
rule was exemplified in the English case, Barnum v. Dennis,32 where the 
 
 21. Khalifa, 404 Md. at 113, 945 A.2d at 1247.  The complaints against Mohammad Osama 
Khalifa, Michael‘s father-in-law, and Dahlia Khalifa, Michael‘s sister-in-law, were dismissed.  Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 113–15, 945 A.2d at 1247–48.   
 25. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 35–44 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
 31. Barham v. Dennis, (1600) 78 Eng. Rep. 1001, 1001 (K.B.).  Daughters generally were not 
considered heirs because a father did not have rights to them upon marriage.  Id. 
 32. 78 Eng. Rep. 1001. 
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court explained that an heir-son was viewed as the father‘s property, and 
thus deprivation of the property required compensation.33  In tandem with 
equating children to property, damages were limited to the father‘s 
economic ―loss of services‖ of the child, requiring a father to plead the loss 
of some economic benefit from the child to bring a viable claim.34   
American courts slowly began disposing of the ―loss of services‖ 
requirement in favor of a more modern approach, recognizing the need for 
recovery in tort for the loss of society and companionship of a family 
member.35  In the 1913 case Howell v. Howell,36 a mother abducted her 
child to avoid relinquishing custody to the child‘s father.37  The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina concluded that the loss of services requirement was 
―an outworn fiction,‖ and an abduction action could be brought instead on 
the basis of compensation for any expenses incurred and ―punitive damages 
for the wrong done him in his affections and the destruction of his 
household.‖38  Likewise, in the 1930 case Pickle v. Page,39 the New York 
Court of Appeals found that it was against public policy to require the loss 
of services of a child to recover in an abduction action because the injury is 
directly inflicted on the parent.40 
More recently, courts have clarified that the loss of services concept is 
outdated and no longer required for a viable abduction claim.41  For 
example, in Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc.,42 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained that the basis for a claim of 
tortious interference with a parent-child relationship is ―the loss of filial 
consortium,‖ not the loss of services.43  Indeed, many jurisdictions have 
 
 33. Id. at 1001. 
 34. See id.  Even as early as Barham, some judges espoused the idea that a father had an 
interest in all of his children because he receives comfort and society from them, thus finding that 
courts should grant recovery regardless of whether the father lost his child‘s services.  Id. at 1002 
(Glanvile, J., dissenting). 
 35. See, e.g., Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (―Under the so-
called modern view, the essence of the claim is the interference with the parent‘s custodial rights, 
not the loss of the child‘s services.‖); Howell v. Howell, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1913) (―[T]he 
modern authorities . . . have advanced, and now the parent can recover damages for the unlawful 
taking away or concealment of a minor child, and [the damages are] not limited to . . . the fiction 
of ‗loss of services.‘‖).  
 36. 78 S.E. 222. 
 37. Id. at 223. 
 38. Id. at 224 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. 169 N.E. 650 (N.Y. 1930). 
 40. Id. at 653. 
 41. See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 42. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1991). 
 43. Id. at 352.  Filial consortium is similar to marital consortium and includes loss of ―society, 
affection, [and] companionship.‖  See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Mass. 1973) 
(defining consortium to include ―services, society, affection [and] companionship‖). 
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adopted comment d to section 700 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which maintains that ―loss of service or impairment of ability to perform 
service is not a necessary element of a cause of action [for an abduction 
claim].‖44  
Maryland first considered whether to recognize a tort claim for the 
abduction of a child in Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot.45  There, the aunt and 
uncle of a minor child, looking to raise the child as their own, abducted the 
child from her other aunt, who was the child‘s court-appointed guardian.46  
The plaintiff based her desired damages claim on the loss of society and 
affection of the child.47  Although the Maryland Court of Appeals 
ultimately held that the plaintiff did not have a viable claim because there 
was no evidence that the defendant used force, fraud, open violence, or 
persuasion to abduct the child,48 the court implicitly recognized a cause of 
action for abduction by enumerating the necessary elements for a viable 
abduction claim and concluding that the elements were not present in the 
case.49   
B.  There is a National Trend to Recognize a Cause of Action for 
Tortious Interference with the Custodial Parent-Child Relationship 
The tort of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship is 
the modern interpretation of the tort for abduction and harboring of a child 
from a parent.50  The tort of intentional interference with the parent-child 
relationship is broader than its ancestor, allowing recovery in more 
instances than the tort of abduction of a child.51  
 
 44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977); see also Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 
123, 127 (Iowa 1983) (finding that § 700 is recognized and applied by a majority of jurisdictions). 
 45. 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601 (1905). 
 46. Id. at 509–10, 60 A. at 601.   
 47. Id., 60 A. at 601–02. 
 48. Id. at 516, 60 A. at 604.   
 49. Id. at 513, 60 A. at 603–04.  The court defined abduction as the ―unlawful taking or 
detention by force, fraud or persuasion of a person, as a wife, a child or a ward from the 
possession, custody or control of the person legally entitled thereto‖ and harboring as ―to receive 
clandestinely or without legal authority, a person for the purpose of so concealing him that another 
having the right to the legal custody of such person shall be deprived thereof.‖  Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).    
 50. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 352 (Mass. 1991).  See also 
Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1999) (―A cause of action for interference with a 
custodial parent-child relationship has its roots in English common law . . . .‖). 
 51. See Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138–39 (Okla. 1993).  Generally, the tort of 
abduction requires a showing of force, fraud or concealment.  Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 
508, 513, 60 A. 601, 603 (1905).  The tort of intentional interference with the parent-child 
relationship, however, may require only a showing of a parental or custodial relationship with the 
child, third party interference with the relationship without the consent of the parent, and damages 
as a result of such interference.  Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765–66 (W. Va. 1998).  
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The current trend among states is to recognize a cause of action for the 
tort of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship when the 
interference is with a parent‘s custodial rights.52  For example, in Kessel v. 
Leavitt,53 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized a tort 
claim for intentional interference with the custodial relationship, basing its 
decision on the court‘s previous recognition of other tortious interference 
claims, the state‘s criminal statutes that punish such interference, and the 
recognized importance of custodial rights.54  Many jurisdictions support 
their decisions to adopt such a tort claim with the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts conclusion that there is a viable claim when a person abducts, 
compels, or induces a minor child to leave a parent‘s custody knowing that 
the parent does not consent.55  For example, in Politte v. Politte,56 the 
Missouri Court of Appeals found it clear under the Restatement that only a 
custodial parent can sue for interference with the parent-child relationship, 
recognizing the tort claim for a custodial parent but declining to extend the 
right to parties with visitation rights.57  Only a few courts have rejected this 
cause of action on policy and precedent-related grounds.58  As part of this 
minority, the court in Larson v. Dunn59 relied on the policy rationales that 
(1) the burden on children from additional litigation is too great to adopt the 
new tort, (2) other remedies such as contempt actions are available, and (3) 
the tort may not adequately deter parental abduction.60   
 
 52. See, e.g., Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 350–51 (recognizing a cause of action for tortious 
interference with custodial rights); see also DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1018 (3d Cir. 
1984) (same); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Anonymous v. 
Anonymous, 672 So. 2d 787, 790 (Ala. 1995) (same); Surina v. Lucey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509, 511–
12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1039 (same); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 
123, 127 (Iowa 1983) (same); Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (same); 
Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1300 (N.H. 1983) (same); Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 765 (same).   
 53. 511 S.E.2d 720. 
 54. Id. at 765. 
 55. See, e.g., DiRuggiero, 743 F.2d at 1018 (following the Restatement‘s view of a tort claim 
for interference with the parent-child relationship); Anonymous, 627 So. 2d at 789 (same); Surina, 
214 Cal. Rptr. 509 at 512–13 (same); Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1041–42 (same); Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 
127 (same); Murphy, 571 N.E.2d. at 351 (same); Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 760–61 (same). 
 56. 727 S.W.2d 198. 
 57. Id. at 200. 
 58. See Marshak v. Marshak, 628 A.2d 964, 969, 971 (Conn. 1993) (refusing to recognize a 
cause of action for interference with the parent-child relationship where parents have joint legal 
custody); Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 45, 47 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to recognize a cause of 
action for interference with the parent-child relationship because doing so would not be in the best 
interests of children); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138 (Okla. 1993) (refusing to recognize 
a cause of action for interference with the parent-child relationship because the court had never 
recognized the tort before).   
 59. 460 N.W.2d 39. 
 60. Id. at 45–47. 
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C.  Although Courts Have Recognized a Cause of Action for 
Interference with the Custodial Parent-Child Relationship, There Is 
No National Trend to Adopt a Cause of Action for Interference with 
Visitation Rights 
Although the trend among courts is to recognize a cause of action for 
intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship,61 few 
states recognize a cause of action for interference with visitation rights.62  
In Ruffalo v. United States,63 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri made an ―educated guess‖ about the state law 
in Missouri and concluded that the court would likely recognize a damages 
claim for interference with visitation rights.64  Three years later, however, 
in Politte v. Politte,65  the Missouri Court of Appeals found no valid claim 
for interference with temporary custody and visitation rights.66  In Politte, 
the father of three children brought a claim for money damages against his 
ex-wife for refusing to allow him to exercise his visitation rights.67  In 
declining to recognize a cause of action for interference with visitation 
rights, the court concluded that there are other adequate remedies in place to 
address this wrong, the best interests of the child would not be served by 
further court action, and the Restatement did not provide relief in this 
instance.68   
Jurisdictions that have refused to recognize a tort claim for 
interference with visitation rights have done so because they view visitation 
rights as lesser than custodial rights,69 and because policy favors a narrower 
scope for the tort of intentional interference with the parent-child 
relationship.70  For instance, in Gleiss v. Newman,71 the Court of Appeals 
 
 61. See supra Part II.B. 
 62. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 471 So. 2d 920, 921 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to 
recognize a cause of action for interference with visitation rights); Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 
845, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (same); Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 1994) 
(same).  Contra Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706, 713 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that 
Missouri state law would likely recognize a cause of action for interference with visitation rights).  
But see Politte, 727 S.W.2d at 200–01 (restricting the application of the Ruffalo decision). 
 63. 590 F. Supp. 706. 
 64. Id. at 713. 
 65. 727 S.W.2d 198. 
 66. Id. at 198. 
 67. Id. at 198–99.  
 68. Id. at 200–01. 
 69. See id. at 200 (discussing Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) 
(―[V]isitation rights or right to temporary custody [are] not significant enough to be protected by 
this tort.‖); Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 1994) (commenting that, unlike 
custody rights, ―visitation rights of a parent are not sufficiently significant to be protected by this 
court‖). 
 70. See Politte, 727 S.W.2d at 200–01 (finding that the tort is not in the best interests of 
children and that there are other available remedies for a complaint of interference with visitation 
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of Wisconsin expressed concern that allowing a tort for interference with 
visitation rights would open the door for ―a host of actions‖ that would 
burden courts when there are already other adequate remedies available.72  
Furthermore, the court found that recognizing the claim would be contrary 
to the best interests of children because it would shift the court‘s focus to 
parental compensation.73 
D.  Prior to Khalifa, Maryland Refused to Adopt a Tort Claim for 
Intentional Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship 
The Maryland Court of Appeals first discussed whether to adopt a 
cause of action for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship 
in the 1986 case Hixon v. Buchberger.74  In Hixon, a minor child‘s 
biological father with visitation rights complained of ―belligerent and 
hostile statements‖ made towards him by the defendant,75 making it 
difficult for him to physically take his child during court-ordered visitation 
sessions.76  The court found that Maryland had never expressed a 
substantive right to non-custodial parent visitation, given the tenuous nature 
of the right.77  Moreover, the court concluded that the actual interference in 
this instance was relatively minor.78  The court explicitly stated that it was 
not deciding whether, or under what circumstances, a cause of action in tort 
would exist for interference with visitation rights.79  The court narrowly 
held that when ―a parent or that parent‘s ally who, without committing any 
tort presently recognized in Maryland, speaks hostilely to the other parent 
about that parent‘s exercise of custody or visitation rights does not thereby 
become liable in damages.‖80 
Following Hixon, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and Court of 
Appeals respectively decided Lapides v. Trabbic81 and Gaver v. Harrant.82  
 
rights); Cosner, 882 P.2d at 1247 (refusing to extend the tort to visitation rights based on evidence 
demonstrating that it is not in the best interest of children).  See also Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 
204, 219, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998) (explaining that the ―best interests of the child standard‖ is 
the principal consideration in Maryland family law decisions); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 
174–75, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977) (same). 
 71. 415 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 72. Id. at 846. 
 73. Id. at 846–47.  
 74. 306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986). 
 75. Id. at 74, 507 A.2d at 608.  The defendant was the child‘s biological mother‘s fiancée.   
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 82–83, 507 A.2d at 612. 
 78. Id. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 134 Md. App. 51, 758 A.2d 1114 (2000). 
 82. 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989). 
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The Court of Special Appeals in Lapides declined to recognize a cause of 
action for interference with the parent-child relationship where the mother 
allegedly interfered with the father‘s ability to communicate and spend time 
with the child.83  Because the parents‘ custody agreement allowed the 
minor child to ―choose the location where she resides on any given day,‖ 
neither parent had superior physical custody rights to the child, and the 
court stated that it would not extend a tort remedy to such a claim, given the 
equal custody and lack of severe circumstances.84  In Gaver, the Court of 
Appeals similarly refused to recognize a minor child‘s cause of action for 
loss of parental society and affection where the minor child‘s father was 
severely injured in a construction accident because no precedent recognized 
such a tort and there were no pressing circumstances or societal need to 
recognize the new tort.85 
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In Khalifa v. Shannon,86 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
parent may bring a civil claim for tortious interference with custody and 
visitation rights regardless of whether the parent loses the services of the 
child.87  The court further held that the damages awarded to Michael 
Shannon for this claim were not excessive.88  Writing for the majority, 
Judge Battaglia began by explaining that Maryland first acknowledged a 
tort for abduction and harboring of a child from a parent in 1905.89  The 
court traced the common law origin of the tort of abduction, explaining that 
an action in trespass was historically maintainable at common law only by a 
father where the abducted child was his son and heir.90   
The court commented that it had first addressed whether abduction and 
harboring could be the basis of a cause of action for interference with the 
 
 83. Lapides, 134 Md. App. at 54–55, 65, 758 A.2d at 1115, 1121.  
 84. Id. at 64–65, 758 A.2d at 1120–21 (finding that absent enticement or abduction of a child 
from the home, the adverse consequences of refusing to add a tort action for interference with 
parental rights were mitigated by the adequate remedies currently in place in the family court 
system). 
 85. Gaver, 316 Md. at 18, 33, 557 A.2d at 211, 218. 
 86. 404 Md. 107, 945 A.2d 1244 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 111, 945 A.2d at 1246. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 116, 945 A.2d at 1249 (citing Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601 
(1905)). 
 90. Id. at 119–21, 945 A.2d at 1251–52.  This is because an heir-son ―belonged‖ to the father, 
whereas there was no property interest imputed to the father for daughters and non-heir sons in 
marriage.  See id. at 119–20, 945 A.2d at 1251 (discussing Barham v. Dennis, (1600) 78 Eng. Rep. 
1001 (K.B.)).   
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parent-child relationship in Hixon v. Buchberger.91  In Hixon, the majority 
noted, the court held that the petitioner‘s allegations were insufficient to 
prove interference with the parent-child relationship.92  By holding that the 
claim was insufficient to prove the tort, the Khalifa court concluded that the 
Hixon court implicitly recognized the tort‘s existence.93  The majority 
stated that the Hixon court defined the necessary elements to prove 
interference with the parent-child relationship by asserting that ―belligerent 
words‖ were insufficient to prove an interference with the parent-child 
relationship.94  Unlike the petitioner in Hixon, the majority found here that 
Michael Shannon sufficiently alleged the elements for the tort of 
interference with the parent-child relationship because Nermeen Shannon 
and Afaf Khalifa knowingly, intentionally, and severely interfered with 
Michael‘s custody rights by planning and executing the abduction and 
harboring of the two children.95 
The majority then explained that it was not necessary for a parent to 
allege an economic loss of services to maintain an action for interference 
with the parent-child relationship.96  The court averred that loss of services 
was never an element of the tort of abduction itself, but instead was an 
arcane common law pleading requirement.97 
The court then addressed whether a non-custodial parent could bring a 
claim for interference with the parent-child relationship based on a loss of 
visitation rights.98  Because the Hixon court distinguished minor from 
 
 91. Id. at 124, 945 A.2d at 1254 (citing Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 
(1986)). 
 92. Id. at 126, 945 A.2d at 1255 (citing Hixon, 306 Md. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612). 
 93. Id. at 126–27, 945 A.2d at 1255 (citing Hixon, 306 Md. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612). 
 94. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 95. Id. at 127, 945 A.2d at 1256. 
 96. Id. at 138–39, 945 A.2d at 1262. 
 97. Id. at 128, 945 A.2d at 1256.  The court explained that, at common law, a plaintiff was 
required to plead one of two subcategories of trespass for a tort claim: trespass on the case, also 
known as the ―case,‖ or trespass vi et armis, also known simply as ―trespass.‖  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  When on the case, a viable claim for interference with a parent-child 
relationship required loss of services because the claim was based on ―injury to the master 
consequent from the injury to the servant . . . .‖  Id. at 129, 945 A.2d at 1257.  Conversely, in 
some states, when a plaintiff brought an action for trespass alleging direct injury to a father, no 
loss of services was required and a father could receive both pecuniary and emotional 
compensation.  Id. at 121–23, 945 A.2d at 1252–53.  An action could be brought for trespass 
without a loss of services because the father was deprived of the comfort and society of a child to 
which he was entitled as a guardian.  Id. at 132–33, 945 A.2d at 1259.  Although the Maryland 
Court of Appeals had not determined whether an abduction action would lie in trespass, several 
other states at common law found that a loss of services was not required and an action in trespass 
could be brought for an abduction claim.  Id. at 132, 945 A.2d at 1258–59.  The Khalifa court thus 
found that because an abduction action, which was the precursor to an action for interference with 
the parent-child relationship, could be brought on the case or in trespass at common law, loss of 
services was not required to maintain the cause of action.  Id. at 138, 945 A.2d at 1262. 
 98. Id. at 139, 945 A.2d at 1262–63. 
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major interferences with visitation rights, the court determined that 
Maryland recognized a cause of action for interference with visitation 
rights, with the threshold requirement that the interference not be minor.99 
Last, the court concluded that the damages awarded to Michael 
Shannon were not excessive or disproportionate because the factors for 
determining a punitive damages award weighed in favor of upholding the 
judgment of damages against Nermeen Shannon and Afaf Khalifa.100   
Judge Raker concurred in the judgment because, while she agreed that 
the court could create a new cause of action in tort,101 she believed that the 
court should have announced that it was creating a new tort for intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship rather than straining to 
interpret Hixon v. Buchberger as adopting the tort in 1986.102  Judge Raker 
read Hixon as holding only that minor custody interferences did not 
interfere with custody rights.103  
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Khalifa v. Shannon,104 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that 
there is a cognizable claim for tortious interference with the parent-child 
relationship when there is an obstruction of custodial or visitation rights.105  
Furthermore, the court abolished the common law requirement that the 
claimant prove a loss of services caused by the interference.106  In so 
holding, the court based its decision on a questionable interpretation of 
Hixon v. Buchberger.107  Although the Khalifa court correctly followed the 
national trend in adopting a new tort for interference with the parent-child 
relationship,108 the court adopted an overly broad rule that failed to account 
for significant policy implications that favor a rule limited to protecting 
 
 99. Id. at 141, 945 A.2d at 1264.  
 100. Id. at 149, 945 A.2d at 1269.  The court determined whether punitive damages were 
excessive by looking to ―(1) the defendant‘s ability to pay; (2) the relationship of the award to 
statutorily imposed criminal fines; (3) the amount of the award in comparison to other final 
punitive damage awards in the jurisdiction . . . ; (4) the gravity of the defendant‘s conduct; (5) the 
deterrent value of the award both with respect to the defendant and the general public; (6) whether 
compensatory damages . . . sufficiently compensate the plaintiff; and (7) whether a reasonable 
relationship exists between compensatory and punitive damages.‖  Id. at 142–43, 945 A.2d at 
1265. 
 101. Id. at 149–50, 945 A.2d at 1269 (Raker, J., concurring) (commenting that the court should 
have either stated that it was adopting a new tort and given the reasons why, or left policy 
decisions up to the legislature). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. 404 Md. 107, 945 A.2d 1244. 
 105. Id. at 111, 945 A.2d at 1246 (majority opinion).   
 106. Id. at 138–39, 945 A.2d at 1262.   
 107. See infra Part IV.A. 
 108. See infra Part IV.B. 
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against interference with custodial rights, and not visitation rights.109  
Although the court properly decided Khalifa given the severity of the 
circumstances, the court should have limited its new tort to interference 
with custodial rights.110 
A.  The Court Improperly Applied Precedent by Concluding that 
Maryland Already Adopted a Cause of Action for Intentional 
Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship in Hixon v. 
Buchberger  
The court‘s analysis in Khalifa improperly rested on the premise that 
Maryland previously adopted a cause of action for intentional interference 
with the parent-child relationship in Hixon v. Buchberger.111  In Hixon, the 
court explicitly stated that it did not decide whether or under what 
circumstances a cause of action would lie for interference with visitation 
rights.112  The Hixon court simply articulated the narrow holding that ―a 
parent or that parent‘s ally who, without committing any tort presently 
recognized in Maryland, speaks hostilely to the other parent about that 
parent‘s exercise of custody or visitation rights does not thereby become 
liable in damages.‖113  By restricting its holding to the specific facts of the 
case and stating that it was not deciding whether to adopt the tort claim, the 
Hixon court only declined to implement a completely new tort under those 
circumstances.114  Thus, the Khalifa court incorrectly concluded that 
Hixon‘s holding implicitly recognized a tort remedy for interference with 
the parent-child relationship.115 
By relying primarily on the faulty presumption that Maryland 
recognized the tort of interference with custody and visitation rights in 
Hixon,116 the Khalifa court failed to consider the policy implications of its 
new tort. Thus, this Note examines the gaping hole in the court‘s reasoning 
by examining the legal and policy justifications that the court failed to 
address in adopting the new tort.117   
 
 109. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 110. See infra Part IV.C. 
 111. See Khalifa, 404 Md. at 149–50, 945 A.2d at 1269 (Raker, J., concurring) (arguing that 
Hixon did not recognize a cause of action for interference with the parent-child relationship 
because the court stated only that the interference in Hixon was relatively minor and would not 
amount to a tortious interference with custody rights in most jurisdictions).  
 112. Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 83, 507 A.2d 607, 612 (1986). 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Khalifa, 404 Md. at 149–50, 945 A.2d at 1269. 
 115. See id. (disagreeing with the Khalifa majority‘s reading of the Hixon holding). 
 116. See id. at 126–27, 945 A.2d at 1255–56 (majority opinion) (finding that the court in Hixon 
recognized the tort of interference with the parent-child relationship and that Shannon sufficiently 
alleged the necessary facts to win the case under Hixon). 
 117. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
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B.  The Khalifa Court Correctly Adopted a Tort for Intentional 
Interference with Custodial Rights that Follows the National Trend 
and Addresses Policy Concerns 
Although the Khalifa court based its analysis on a faulty reading of 
Hixon when it adopted the new tort,118 the court correctly adopted a cause 
of action for interference with the parent-child custodial relationship.119  In 
adopting this new tort, the Khalifa court properly followed the national 
trend by recognizing a cause of action for interference with custodial rights 
and refusing to require a loss of services to bring the claim.120 
First, the Khalifa court properly followed the national trend by 
adopting a cause of action for interference with custodial rights, recognizing 
that the problem of child abduction by family members is serious, and 
joining its sister states in attempting to curb the problem.121  Family 
member child abduction cases are very common—in 1999, an estimated 
203,900 children were victims of a family abduction.122  The predominant 
motive for such abduction is to permanently interfere with custodial 
rights.123  By adopting this new tort, states have shown that they recognize 
the volume of child abduction cases in the custodial context, as well as the 
need for a broad, comprehensive claim to address the issue.124  Thus, the 
 
 118. See supra Part IV.A. 
 119. See infra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.  Maryland precedent supports the 
adoption of the new tort for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship because this 
tort is the modern application of the tort of abduction, which Maryland recognized in 
Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 508, 60 A. 601 (1905).  See supra notes 45–50 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. See infra notes 121–127 and accompanying text. 
 121. See, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 1999) (―[T]he majority of states . . . 
have recognized a cause of action for intentional interference with the custodial parent-child 
relationship.‖); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 126–27 (Iowa 1983) (following the majority of 
jurisdictions in recognizing a tort claim for intentional interference with the custodial parent-child 
relationship because a tort claim is the most effective remedy to prevent kidnapping and to 
provide sanctions if kidnapping does occur).    
 122. HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., NAT‘L INCIDENCE STUDIES OF MISSING, ABDUCTED, 
RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN, CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY FAMILY MEMBERS: 
NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196466.pdf.  The study defined family abduction as ―the 
taking or keeping of a child by a family member in violation of a custody order, a decree, or other 
legitimate custodial rights, where the taking or keeping involved some element of concealment, 
flight, or intent to deprive a lawful custodian indefinitely of custodial privileges.‖  Id. 
 123. Id. at 6.  The study found that this was the most common serious element in 82% of cases. 
Id.  The children abducted tended to be under six years old, and abductions overwhelmingly 
occurred when the child was not living with both parents.  Id. at 4. 
 124. See, e.g., Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 127 (following the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing 
a claim for interference with the custodial parent-child relationship and finding that a tort claim 
―will be more likely to effect a speedy return of the child;  . . . will result in better cooperation by 
potential third-party defendants seeking to avoid the suit; and increased knowledge of a child‘s 
whereabouts will result through the broad scope of civil-case discovery‖). 
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prevalence and seriousness of interference with the custodial relationship 
supports providing a tort remedy.125   
Second, the court properly followed the modern trend among states by 
confirming that the Maryland tort does not require the archaic loss of 
services element established by old, common law abduction cases.126  In 
doing so, the Khalifa court, like its sister courts, recognized the importance 
of emotional bonds between parents and their children.127  Therefore, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals, consistent with the national trend of adopting 
the tort of intentional interference with the custodial parent-child 
relationship, correctly concluded that Maryland should recognize the claim. 
C.  The Court of Appeals Failed to Consider Policy Implications that 
Favored Restricting the New Tort to Interference with Custodial 
Rights and Instead Adopted an Overly Inclusive Tort Action for 
Interference with Custodial and Visitation Rights 
The Khalifa court strayed from the national trend by adopting an 
overly expansive tort of intentional interference with the parent-child 
relationship that includes interference with visitation rights.128  Instead, 
considering that most other jurisdictions have refused to extend the tort 
claim to interference with visitation rights,129 the court should have 
carefully weighed policy concerns before adopting this new tort. 
 
 125. See Kristin A. Wentzel, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child? Minnesota’s Refusal to 
Recognize the Tort of Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights: Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 
39 (Minn. 1990), 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1990) (arguing that child kidnapping by 
family members is a serious concern and that courts should adopt a tort remedy to combat the 
problem). 
 126. See, e.g., Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 352 (Mass. 1991) 
(finding that a tort claim for interfering with the parent-child relationship is based on a loss of 
comfort and society of a child, not a loss of services); Howell v. Howell, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 
1913) (―[T]he modern authorities . . . have advanced, and now the parent can recover damages for 
the unlawful taking away or concealment of a minor child, and [the damages are] not limited 
to . . . the fiction of ‗loss of services.‘‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700(d) (1977) 
(―Under the rule stated in this section, loss of services or impairment of ability to perform services 
is not a necessary element of a cause of action.‖). 
 127. See Hodge v. Carroll County Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 812 F. Supp. 593, 600 (D. Md. 1992) 
(agreeing with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and explaining that there is ―no more 
important relationship, no more basic bond in American society, than the tie between parent and 
child‖); see also Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1301 (N.H. 1983) (―The high place accorded 
filiation stems not from the material bond whereby services are provided to each other by parent 
and child but from a recognition that there is a sanctity in the union of parent and child that 
transcends economics and deserves the utmost respect.‖). 
 128. See Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md. 107, 111, 945 A.2d 1244, 1246 (2008) (recognizing the 
tort of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship for interference with both custody 
and visitation rights). 
 129. See Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 1994) (―The jurisdictions recognizing 
this tort [for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship] have limited the cause of 
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Persuasive policy considerations weigh against extending the tort of 
interference with parent-child relationships to encompass interference with 
visitation rights.130  First, by adopting a tort for interference with visitation 
rights, the court failed to keep the best interests of the child at the forefront 
of its decision.131  The controlling standard in Maryland family law cases 
involving children is always, above everything else, what is in the best 
interests of the child.132  It is in a child‘s best interest to minimize court 
battles because such litigation has a detrimental effect on a child‘s 
emotional well-being.133  Indeed, the primary goal of this tort is financial 
compensation for one parent against another, which does not serve a child‘s 
best interests.134  Protection of a parent‘s visitation rights is better achieved 
through other means available through the court system, including contempt 
actions, criminal sanctions, and actions for modification of visitation 
rights.135  
Second, although many of these policy concerns can also apply in the 
context of interference with custodial rights, courts routinely recognize that 
custodial rights are entitled to greater protection than visitation rights.  A 
parent with custodial rights is the primary care provider for the child while 
a parent with visitation rights has significantly lesser obligations to the 
child.136  Thus, interference with custodial rights affects the best interests of 
 
action to the custodial parent and have not extended it to a non-custodial parent who is somehow 
deprived of visitation privileges.‖). 
 130. See infra notes 131–152 and accompanying text. 
 131. Cf. Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (―[T]he recognition of 
[interfering with a non-custodial parent‘s visitation rights] would not be in the child‘s best 
interests.‖).   
 132. See Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998) (―The best interests 
of the child standard has long been applied by Maryland courts to resolve family law disputes.‖); 
Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174–75, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977) (stating that the best interest of 
the child standard is ―firmly entrenched in Maryland‖ and is ―of transcendent importance‖). 
 133. Research indicates that the events following the separation of spouses and the degree of 
conflict between spouses lead to significant adjustment problems in the children of the divorced 
couple.  See, e.g., John H. Grych & Frank D. Fincham, Interventions for Children and Divorce: 
Toward Greater Integration of Research and Action, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 434, 436 (1992).  See 
also Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 45–46 (Minn. 1990) (declining to adopt a cause of action 
for interference with the parent-child relationship because this new tort would place an undue 
burden on children). 
 134. See Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the goal of 
this tort is ―the vindication of one parent against the other‖). Unfortunately, divorcing couples 
may try to leverage their bargaining power for alimony or property allocation by using the child to 
their advantage.  See id. at 201 (noting that parents could use this tort to drain the finances of the 
other parent). 
 135. See Gleiss, 415 N.W.2d at 846 (finding that there are other adequate remedies available to 
enforce visitation rights); see also Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46 (―[T]he proper remedy for such 
violation of the court‘s integrity lies in contempt and other such sanctions; not in providing the 
other party with compensation.‖). 
 136. A parent with visitation rights can have varying degrees of access to the child.  See 
Boswell, 352 Md. at 220, 721 A.2d at 669 (―‗[A] parent whose child is placed in the custody of 
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the child more severely than interference with visitation rights, and 
therefore the custodial relationship needs additional protection.137  
Moreover, although the Khalifa court limited the new tort to ―substantial 
interferences‖ with visitation rights by its reliance on Hixon, this fails to 
consider situations where the court orders visitation for infrequent periods, 
for example once or twice a week, or when the interference is with third 
party visitation rights.138  A narrowly tailored tort remedy for interference 
with custodial rights, but excluding interference with visitation rights, 
would have more efficiently addressed concerns of family member 
abduction within this legal framework. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals should have carefully considered the 
policy implications of extending a new tort to interference with visitation 
rights because allowing such a broad cause of action will significantly 
burden the court system and produce a flood of lawsuits.139  Because the 
Khalifa court established a very broad scope for the tort of intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship,140 this unclear standard will 
likely invite a tremendous number of lawsuits over the next few years.141   
The Khalifa court appropriately found intentional interference with the 
parent-child relationship because this case involved an extreme instance of 
interference with parental rights.142  In Khalifa, the children were not 
 
another person has a right of access to the child at reasonable times.‘‖ (emphasis in original) 
(quoting 2 WILLIAM T. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.26, at 274–75 (1961))).  A non-
custodial parent may have rights to liberal visitation with their child ―‗at reasonable times and 
under reasonable conditions, but this right is not absolute‘‖ and can be limited.  Id. (quoting Myers 
v. Butler, 10 Md. App. 315, 317, 270 A.2d 341, 342 (1970)).  
 137. Interference with the obligations of a custodial parent affects significant decisions about 
the child‘s life and future.  Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 296, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (1986).  
Interference with visitation, however, only interferes with the interaction between a non-custodial 
parent and his or her child.  See supra note 136. 
 138. See, e.g., Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md. 107, 140–41, 945 A.2d 1244, 1264 (2008) 
(holding only that interference with visitation rights cannot be ―less than a major or substantial 
interference‖).   
 139. See Gleiss, 415 N.W.2d at 846 (finding that if a tort action for interference with visitation 
rights is recognized, ―a host of actions would follow‖).  See also infra notes 140–152 and 
accompanying text. 
 140. The Khalifa court identified the inner limits—what will not constitute a cause of action 
for interference with the parent-child relationship—based on Hixon‘s holding that a parent 
speaking hostilely to another parent is not sufficient.  Khalifa, 404 Md. at 126–27, 945 A.2d at 
1255.  The court also identified the extreme outer limits of the action by explaining that a parent 
interfering with visitation and custodial rights by abducting children and harboring a child in a 
foreign country will create a viable cause of action for interference with parental rights.  Id. at 
141, 945 A.2d at 1264. 
 141. See Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (acknowledging the potential for 
serious abuse of the court system where this type of litigation already results in ―bitter accusations 
and contradictory affidavits‖). 
 142. See Khalifa, 404 Md. at 127, 945 A.2d at 1256 (noting that Nermeen Shannon abducted 
the children to Egypt by telling her former husband she was going to visit family in New York and 
refused to allow them to return to the United States).      
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involved in the lawsuit because they remained in Egypt throughout the 
process;143 thus, only the kidnapping had a detrimental impact on the 
children, not the civil suit.  However, most cases involve less drastic 
situations, more like the circumstances in Hixon and Politte.144  In Hixon 
and Politte, parents disputed interference with visitation rights, but the 
parties‘ whereabouts were known and the situations could be remedied 
through ordinary court procedures.145  With the Khalifa court‘s broad 
holding that defines only the outer and inner limits of a very broad tort for 
intentional interference with the parent–child relationship,146 parents can 
bring viable actions in significantly less severe cases than Khalifa under this 
tort.147  By failing to set narrower limits for the new tort, the court may not 
only jeopardize its ability to act in the best interests of the child but also 
waste court resources by hearing frivolous suits.148 
The opportunity for additional litigation in this area is precisely the 
result that the Khalifa court should have discouraged—as the Missouri 
Court of Appeals eloquently stated in Politte, ―[d]isarmament is needed to 
limit post-marital warfare, not additional armament to increase it.‖149  
Moreover, this new tort remedy for interference with visitation rights will 
not likely deter child abductions because family relationships and disputes 
often involve emotional situations where potential sanctions are 
incomparable to the threat of losing a child.150  These emotions often 
outweigh any rational consideration of economic penalties when a parent 
 
 143. Id. at 112, 945 A.2d at 1247.  
 144. In Hixon, a minor child‘s biological father complained of ―belligerent and hostile 
statements‖ that made it difficult for him to physically take his child during court-ordered 
visitation sessions.  Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 74, 507 A.2d 607, 608 (1986).  In Politte, 
the child‘s biological father complained that the mother subjected the children to ―an unfit moral 
atmosphere‖ and tried to turn the children against him, which had a detrimental effect on his 
relationship with the children.  Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 198–99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 145. See Hixon, 306 Md. at 83, 507 A.2d at 612 (finding no claim for interference with the 
parent-child relationship where the allegedly tortious action involved only hostile remarks from 
one parent to the other); Politte, 727 S.W.2d at 201 (finding other routes to remedy the situation of 
interference with visitation rights where the mother did not allow the father to exercise his 
visitation rights). 
 146. See Khalifa, 404 Md. at 126–27, 945 A.2d at 1255–56 (finding the ―belligerent words‖ in 
Hixon too minor for a tortious interference with the parent-child relationship claim but the facts of 
Khalifa severe enough to bring a viable claim). 
 147. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (―[A]llowing this 
type of tort could encourage claims for petty infractions.‖). 
 149. Politte, 727 S.W.2d at 201. 
 150. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46–47 (Minn. 1990) (noting that ―[f]amily ties 
are normally stronger than the fear of money damages,‖ that studies show parents believe they are 
saving their child from abuse when abducting them, and that these fears, though sometimes 
misplaced, are often genuine). 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Rosenberg.pdf 
2009] KHALIFA v. SHANNON 141 
fears losing his or her child.151  The Maryland Court of Appeals should 
have adequately weighed the policy considerations of adopting a broad new 
tort for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship.152  While 
a tort action for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship is 
justified, the Khalifa court‘s inclusion of interference with visitation rights 
resulted in an overbroad rule that opposes the best interests of children and 
increases burdens on the court system.   
V. CONCLUSION 
In Khalifa v. Shannon, the Maryland Court of Appeals relied on a 
faulty interpretation of precedent in adopting a new tort for intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship that is overly broad in light of 
the trend among other states as well as the policy implications of adopting 
the tort.153  Although the court correctly decided Khalifa given the 
circumstances of the case, it should have narrowed the scope of its holding 
and more clearly defined the boundaries for the tort of intentional 
interference with the parent-child relationship.154  The best interests of 
children should always be at the forefront of court decisions involving 
family law matters.155  Therefore, because limiting the opportunities for 
parents to engage in court battles is in the best interest of children and 
because parents have other adequate means by which to protect their 
visitation rights, the Khalifa court should have limited its new cause of 
action in tort for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship 
to protect only custody rights.156 
 
 151. See id. at 46 (arguing that the tort of intentional interference with the parent-child 
relationship will not deter abductors). 
 152. See id. at 45–47 (considering the best interests of the child, the possibility of frivolous 
lawsuits and the other adequate remedies in place when deciding not to adopt a tort for intentional 
interference with visitation rights).  See also Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987) (refusing to adopt a tort remedy for intentional interference with visitation rights 
because it would encourage petty lawsuits, would not be in the best interests of children, and 
because there are other remedies available to enforce the rights). 
 153. See supra Part IV. 
 154. See supra Part IV.C. 
 155. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 130–152 and accompanying text. 
 
